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CASENOTE: SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIES SHERMAN ACT TO SATEL-
LITE BROADCASTING ISSUES
Primetime 24Joint Venture v. National Broadcasting Co., 219 F.3d 92
(2d Cir. 2000).
JULIE NICKOLS
N A DISPLAY of the timeless utility of the Sherman Act, the
Second Circuit recently applied the 110 year-old statute1 to
the modern issue of satellite television transmission.2 In the
1960's the Supreme Court began interpreting the Sherman Act
to allow the combined efforts of members of an industry to in-
fluence government action even though their efforts were de-
signed to eliminate competition. This practice of granting
antitrust immunity for joint petitioning activities became known
as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In order to prevent abuse of
the Noerr-Pennington immunity, courts have established that
parties are not protected from antitrust charges when they initi-
ate government processes to interfere with the business of their
competitor.4 This type of behavior constitutes a "sham," and evi-
dence of it causes parties to lose their Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity. Neither does the doctrine allow group boycotting or other
horizontal agreements except in the narrow instance that the
behavior constitutes protected petitioning activity.5 Recently
the Second Circuit applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in
PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture v. National Broadcasting Co. Here, the
appellate court reversed a motion to dismiss granted by the dis-
trict court in favor of the appellees, the major U.S. television
networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox), and several related groups
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (enacted in 1890).
2 PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2000).
3 See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); see also Cal.
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1971).
4 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
5 PrimeTime, 219 F.3d at 102.
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(hereinafter referred to as "the Networks"). 6 The Second Cir-
cuit then reinstated PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture's ("Prime-
Time's") claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 The Court
reasoned that PrimeTime, a large national satellite television
provider, had stated both a claim under the sham exception to
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and a claim for concerted re-
fusal to deal.8 Although PrimeTime had repeatedly demon-
strated a lack of respect for the copyright interests of the
networks,9 the Second Circuit correctly recognized that the ap-
pellees' efforts to protect their copyright interests had perhaps
gone too far. The court wisely refused to extend the Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity on the facts of this case.
Historically, network owned or affiliated stations have pro-
vided television programming.'0 In recent years, satellite and
cable technologies have introduced a wider range of program-
ming choices and an improved quality of reception for viewers.11
Unlike network broadcasts, which are supported by advertisers,
satellite broadcasts generate revenue by collecting service fees
from the subscriber households. 12 Despite the variety of satellite
content, consumers continue to demand network program-
ming, and satellite operators are at a competitive disadvantage if
they are unable to provide it.13 Because network programming
is copyrighted, satellite providers must obtain a license before
retransmitting the network signal.14
In an effort to balance the interests of consumers with the
copyright interests of the networks, Congress passed the Satellite
Home Viewers Act of 1988 (SHVA) 15 and the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act of 1999.16 Under the SHVA, networks
must license their signals to satellite operators to provide service
6 Id. at 95.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 101, 103.
9 See ABC, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 184 F.3d 348, 350 (4th Cir.
1999); CBS Broad. Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1342,
1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998).





'5 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1995).
16 Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501, 1501A-526 to 1501A-545 (Nov. 29, 1999). The court did not consider
the amendments because the alleged acts occurred under the earlier statute. See
Prime Time, 219 F.3d at 96 n.1.
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to viewers who "cannot receive, through the use of conven-
tional, stationary, outdoor rooftop receiving antenna, an over-
the-air signal of... Grade B intensity as defined by the Federal
Communications Commission .-.. "" and have not received
cable service in the preceding 90 days. 8 The statute establishes
the amount of the royalty fee to be paid for the license. 9 Under
the SHVA, satellite operators determine the households that
they are entitled to serve.20 The local network broadcaster may
challenge a satellite provider's transmission to a household that
is believed to fall within the Grade B contour.21 In response to
the broadcaster's challenge, the satellite operator must either
halt service to that household or conduct a signal-strength test.22
If the test results indicate a signal weak enough to permit satel-
lite service, the network broadcaster must reimburse the satellite
provider for the test.23
PrimeTime alleged that "appellees, in concert with themselves
and with coordination by the NAB [National Association of
Broadcasters], intentionally abused the SHVA's signal-strength
challenge provision by filing baseless challenges for the purpose
of raising PrimeTime's cost structure and thereby reducing com-
petition from it." 24 Allegedly, all of the Networks initiated nu-
merous signal-strength challenges based upon a single
subscriber list that was unique to the broadcast location of a par-
ticular NBC station.2 5 Using a single list would result in over-
challenging because each of the network signals emanates from
a different location and, therefore, each would have a different
Grade B contour.26 PrimeTime also alleged "a concerted refusal
to deal in that appellees agreed among themselves not to license
content to PrimeTime, notwithstanding the fact that it would be
in their interests, acting individually, to do so. "127 Specifically,
PrimeTime contended that the Networks engaged in a group
17 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10)(A) (2000).
18 See PrineTine, 219 F.3d at 96.
19 See 17 U.S.C. § 119(b)(1)(B).
20 See id. § 119(a) (8).
21 See id. § 119(a)(8)(A).
22 See id. § 119(a) (8) (A) (i)-(ii).
23 See id. § 119(a) (8) (B) (ii).
24 PrimeTime, 219 F.3d at 96.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 97.
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boycott after PrimeTime attempted to negotiate licensing agree-
ments with each broadcaster.28
Judge McKenna, of the Southern District of New York,
granted a motion by the Networks to dismiss the claim based
upon the rationale that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which
permits a good faith concerted effort to enforce copyrights, pro-
tected the Networks' conduct. 29 The lower court held that "the
allegations of excessive, willful misuse of the SHVA signal-
strength testing provisions did not fall within the sham excep-
tion to Noerr-Pennington." 3°1 The judge compared the chal-
lenges to pre-litigation "threat letters" and held that they
constituted protected petitioning conduct under Noerr-Pen-
nington 1 In also rejecting the concerted refusal to deal claim,
Judge McKenna found that the complaint alleged nothing more
than the rejection of a settlement offer. 2 The court reasoned
that PrimeTime was seeking to avoid liability for copyright in-
fringement by attempting to negotiate for a licensing arrange-
ment and, therefore, under Noerr-Pennington, the Networks
were under no obligation to negotiate.33
After reviewing the dismissal de novo, 4 the Second Circuit
reinstated the claim. The court found that the onslaught of
signal-strength challenges could constitute a sham, which would
dissolve the Networks' Noerr-Pennington immunity.36 Likewise,
the court regarded the concerted denial of licensing to Prime-
Time as potentially anti-competitive behavior not excused by
Noerr-Pennington .37
First, the Second Circuit determined that PrimeTime ade-
quately alleged a sham in the form of the "filing of frivolous
objections . . . simply in order to impose expense and de-
28 Id. at 102 (citing NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135-136 (1998)
("'a horizontal agreement among direct competitors' [is] a classic per se viola-
tion of the Sherman act."); and Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 212 (1959) ("Group boycotts, or concerted refusals .. .to deal .... have
long been held to be [per se antitrust violations].")).
2 PrimeTime, 219 F.3d at 95.
30 Id. at 97.
31 Id. See McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1560 (11th Cir. 1992)




34 Id. at 98.
35 Id. at 104.
36 Id. at 101.
37 Id. at 103.
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lay ... "38 To determine the sham issue, the court considered
"whether the legal challenges 'are brought pursuant to a policy
of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and
for the purpose of injuring a market rival."' After considering
the allegations that the Networks had engaged in a concerted
effort to overwhelm PrimeTime with numerous signal-strength
challenges for households outside the predicted Grade B con-
tours, the court concluded that the claim had merit.40 If
proven, this sham would negate the Networks' Noerr-Pen-
nington defense. 4
Second, regarding the group boycott element of the claim,
the court considered PrimeTime's allegations that the appellees
worked together to assure that none of the network affiliated or
owned stations would negotiate with PrimeTime.42 The alleged
activity was determined to constitute a "'horizontal agreement
among direct competitors,' a classic per se violation of the Sher-
man Act."43 While recognizing the rights of copyright owners to
coordinate efforts to enforce their rights, the court held that
"copyright holders may not agree to limit their individual free-
dom of action in licensing future rights to ... an infringer
before, during, or after the lawsuit [for copyright infringe-
ment] ."" The court was convinced that PrimeTime's efforts to
negotiate a licensing agreement could be viewed prospectively
rather than as an attempt to settle previous copyright litiga-
tion.45 Viewed prospectively, the Networks' "concerted refusal
to license copyrighted programming to PrimeTime in order to
prevent competition from it is a boycott that, if proven, violates
the Sherman Act."4 6
The Second Circuit's refusal to widen the scope of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is sound. This case illustrates why the
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine exists. Estab-
lished industry groups must not be allowed to use the legal sys-
tem as a club to beat upstart technologies into submission,
38 Id. at 101.
39 Id. (citing USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa County Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 31 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994)).




43 Id. at 102.
44 Id. at 103.
45 Id. at 102.
46 Id. at 103.
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particularly when Congress has enacted legislation recognizing
the public's interest in the success and development of those
new technologies.
With the passage of the SHVA, Congress asserted the impor-
tance of satellite television for Americans who live beyond the
reach of local network broadcasters. The SHVA represents a
compromise that gives consumers the network access upon
which they rely, while respecting the copyright interests of the
networks. Submitting bad-faith signal-strength test challenges
potentially upsets the balance between the two interests. If satel-
lite operators drop customers rather than conduct the costly
tests or if wasteful expenditures drive them out of business, the
scales tip against the consumer.
Additionally, the antitrust regulations against sham litigation
and group boycotts serve an important purpose in the develop-
ment of new technologies. If courts permit existing industry
groups to use the legal system to place emerging technologies at
a disadvantage, progress will be stifled. Granted, network
groups may work together to enforce their existing copyrights,
but the Second Circuit correctly recognized the difference be-
tween litigating past infringements and negotiating future pro-
gramming licensing, which is made compulsory under the
SHVA.
Finally, this case demonstrates the durability of the century-
old Sherman Act. The Act has been called a "common law stat-
ute"47 because 'judicial interpretations of the statute continue to
evolve with technology and adapt to modern economic reali-
ties."4 As PrimeTime 24Joint Venture v. Nat' Broad. Co. illustrates,
the law will allow for good-faith protection of copyright inter-
ests; however, it will not allow those copyright holders to protect
their interests by abusing antitrust principles. The court fo-
cused squarely on the anti-competitive behavior of the appellees
and refused to be swayed by PrimeTime's history of copyright
infringement as demonstrated in other federal courts.4" This
case does, however, reserve the rights of each of the parties to
47 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 13 U. PA. L. Rrv.
1479, 1517 (1987) (citing judge Richard Posner's view that the Sherman Act is a
common law statute which must be interpreted flexibly).
48 Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Antitrust Analysis Applied to Modern Tele-
communications Statute, 224 N.Y.L.J. 17 (2000).
49 ABC, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24Joint Venture, 184 F.3d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1999);




argue prior misdeeds, such as a pattern of copyright infringe-
ment, as part of the damages phase of the trial.50 By narrowly
construing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the court demon-
strated that it would not allow monopolies to use the veil of anti-
trust immunity to further purely anti-competitive interests.
This case has applications beyond the satellite industry. The
monopoly power granted to intellectual property owners has al-
ways been limited because of the potential for anti-competitive
behavior. In an age when new communications technologies,
such as the Internet, increase the potential for intellectual prop-
erty infringement, the Second Circuit has indicated that justice
is not served by expanding the rights of copyright owners to al-
low them to violate antitrust principles in order to protect their
property. Protecting intellectual property is best approached by
enforcing the existing rights of owners not by expanding the
limited monopoly that they already enjoy. Thus, despite the
new challenges presented by emerging technologies, the Sher-
man Act remains on solid footing in an ever-changing economy.
50 PrimeTime, 219 F.3d at 102.
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